ABSTRACT The advent of industry 4.0 with its idea of individualized mass production will significantly increase the demand for more flexibility on the production floor. Wireless communication provides this type of flexibility but puts the automation system at risk as potential attackers now can eavesdrop or even manipulate the messages exchanged even without getting access to the premises of the victim. Cryptographic means can prevent, such attacks if applied properly. One of their core components is the distribution of keys. The generation of keys from channel parameters seems to be a promising approach in comparison with classical approaches based on public key cryptography as it avoids computing intense operations for exchanging keys. In this paper, we investigated key generation approaches using channel parameters recorded in a real industrial environment. Our key results are that the key generation may take unpredictable long and that the resulting keys are of low quality with respect to the test for randomness we applied.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years wireless communication systems have become more and more popular in automation systems. One of the reasons behind this development is that maintenance costs are reduced due to the fact that lesser cables need to be replaced. Another driving factor is that factory floors can be adapted by far quicker than if wired systems are used. The latter will become more important in the near future with the idea of industry 4.0 that postulates individualized mass production, which requires highly flexible production processes. Even though wireless systems are providing obvious benefits for automation systems they open up new challenges with respect to dependability and security. In this article we focus on the latter. Due to the wireless communication potential attackers do not longer need to get access to the premises of the victim to eavesdrop or manipulate the communication of the automation system. The consequences are that competitors may gain know how of the victim, that due to manipulation of the communication the production is disturbed e.g. quality of the products reduced, or the production process is stopped etc. In order to prevent attackers from gaining confidential information and from interfering with the running system security means are essentially needed. The proper use of cryptographic means will help to ensure:
• confidentiality of the data exchanged in the automation system;
• integrity of the messages exchanged;
• authentication of the communication partners. The security of the cryptographic means depends on the secrecy of the keys used. This means that the distribution of the keys is essential for the effectiveness of the security means. Key distribution is known as one of the most demanding problems in the security area. In automation systems the key distribution becomes even more challenging as at least a part of these systems consists of resource constraint devices and due to the fact that these systems need to fulfill real time requirements and require short latency. Additional time and energy are needed for the generation and agreement of cryptographic keys. Thus, the applied key distribution approaches can significantly influence the latency of the message transmission. Taking into account these constraints the idea of generating keys from wireless channel parameters seems very appealing as it avoids computing intense asymmetric cryptography operations.
We investigated the applicability of wireless channel parameters to the key generation in a real industrial environment and compared this approach with classical key exchange methods.
We run our experiments in the model factory of the Innovation Centre Modern Industry Brandenburg, Chair of Automation Technology at BTU Cottbus-Senftenberg [1] . This model factory is well suited to make realistic measurements in a controllable environment. We defined six different set-ups for our measurements to reflect changing conditions in such an environment. We collected and analyzed about 5000 Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) values per measurement with the goal to generate keys using different quantization algorithms and to verify the quality of the generated keys. We estimated the time and energy of the key generation (for the best case) to compare this approach with classical key agreement methods. Our major findings are:
• The time needed to collect sufficient RSSI values to generate a key is unpredictable. It may even take days, thus for real time environments this approach is unsuitable.
• The quality of the keys generated with respect to their randomness is low which may simplify attacks.
• The time and energy needed to establish a key using classical methods are deterministic and lower than those of the key generation from channel parameters. This holds even true if we compare the worst case for classical methods with the best case for key generation from channel parameters. For the last point we admit that we did our calculation based on the assumption that the asymmetric cryptographic operations are accelerated by a special hardware. We are convinced that this is justified since this hardware requires 0.3mm 2 in a 130 nm technology only, i.e. its cost is in the range of 10-20 cent.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the following section we introduce the key generation approaches used for comparison in this paper. Our experiments are presented in section III. Section IV illustrates quantization algorithms discussed in the literature and used in our experiments to generate keys out of channel parameters. In the following section we analyze the quality of the generated keys in detail. Section VI provides a profound comparison of standard key establishment approaches and the channel based key generation investigated here. This paper concludes with a short summary of our major results and a short outlook on next steps.
II. KEY GENERATION APPROACHES
Cryptographic approaches are means to guarantee the confidentiality of a (wireless) communication and the (mutual) authentication of the participants. To be confidential messages have to be encrypted using a cryptographic key. If the cryptographic key used for encryption and for decryption is the same, the cryptographic approach is called symmetric. The currently recommended length of symmetric keys is 128 bit using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm [2] .
The typical problems of symmetric cryptographic approaches are: how the two (or more) participants can securely exchange a shared secret, i.e. the cryptographic key, and how participants can authenticate each other. These problems can be resolved using asymmetric cryptographic approaches such as RSA or elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). In these approaches each participant has a private key, that is its secret, and a public key that can be known by all other parties. The private key and the public key are a pair. Everybody can use the public key of a party to encrypt a message and only the owner of the corresponding private key can decrypt the received message. This can be used to exchange a newly generated symmetric cryptographic key. The latter can be encrypted and confidentially exchanged, i.e. the symmetric key can be encrypted using the public key of the receiver and sent to him as a cipher text. Furthermore, the sender can use its private key to generate a digital signature that can be used for authentication. The receiver can verify the identity of a sender using the public key of the sender (digital signature verification) and can decrypt the message using its own private key.
ECC is much faster than RSA, but in comparison to the AES ECC is slow and leads to a high computational burden for encryption/decryption of messages. Due to this fact, ECC is usually applied only for (mutual) authentication of participants and for confidential exchange of symmetric cryptography keys. The encryption/decryption of the messages is then done using the securely exchanged symmetric key. Table 1 schematically shows some key exchange protocols. The Diffie-Hellmann protocol (DH) was proposed in 1967 and exploits modular exponentiation in finite fields to share a secret between two participants [3] . Both participants use their public knowledge about a prime field GF(p) with a generator g to exchange the secret key secret AB . Using this protocol each participant -Alice and Bob -generates a random number once and performs the modular exponentiation twice (see Table 1 ). The modular exponentiation is a time consuming and processing intense operation, especially if the known numbers p, g and the randomly generated numbers a and b are large. Instead of the modular exponentiation the multiplication of an EC point P with a scalar k, denoted as kP-operation, can be used to share a secret. This protocol is called EC Diffie-Hellmann (ECDH) [4] . The sender and receiver use their public knowledge about an EC over a finite field. Each of the participants generates a random number once and performs the kP-operation twice (see Table 1 ). The DH and ECDH protocols work without using public keys of participants and without any authentication of the participants. If (mutual) authentication is required, it has to be done additionally.
A secret key can be shared between Alice and Bob also by using the ECC encryption. The private and public keys of Alice are k A and Pub A , respectively. These keys are a key pair: (k A ; Pub A ). Bob is the owner of the key pair (k B ; Pub B ). One of the participants, for example Alice, generates the symmetric key secret AB and sends it encrypted to Bob. Alice performs two EC point multiplications to encrypt the message using Bob's public key Pub B ; Bob performs only one kP-operation to decrypt the message using his own private key k B (see Table 1 ). Here is assumed: Alice is sure, that the owner of the public key Pub B is really Bob. Thus, Alice can be sure that only Bob can use the secret AB for the next communication. If Bob requires the authentication of Alice, it has to be done additionally. This way of establishing a common key is denoted as key transport protocol.
Key exchange protocols using the public keys of both participants are computationally more expensive, for example protocols based on the Matsumoto, Takashima, and Imai (MTI) approach. Two types of MTI protocols -A0 and C0 -were proposed in [5] . Alice and Bob know the public keys of each other and assume that the owner of Pub A is Alice and the owner of Pub B is Bob. If the verification of key certificates is required, it has to be done additionally. Alice and Bob generate a random number once and perform three kP operations according to protocol A0 (see Table 1 ). Corresponding to protocol C0 each participant generates a random number and then performs two kP operations and one division in the finite field.
All classical key exchange approaches given in Table 1 need additional steps for the (mutual) identification/ authentication of participants or are vulnerable to some attacks, for example to the man in the middle attack. To increase the resistance of key exchange approaches against these attacks more complex protocols based on MTI were proposed, for example Elliptic Curve Menezes-QuVanstone (ECMQV) approach [6] .
A completely different and relatively new kind of key agreement approaches uses a common source of randomness that is identical only for pairs of communication partners, for example the channel parameters of a wireless communication in a room. This method is based on the reciprocity theorem. If Alice sends an ideal probe signal to Bob, Bob receives a noised signal that is a result of the multipath propagation of the probe signal in the room. If Bob sends the identical probe signal to Alice and if the environment is static (i.e. not changing), Alice receives the same noised signal as Bob i.e. a signal with the same distortion due to the multipath propagation in the room.
The multipath propagation in the room depends on the geometry of the room. Real rooms are not symmetric. This can be used to generate a common secret for Alice and Bob only. Alice and Bob need to use the same quantization algorithm, i.e. an algorithm to obtain the secret AB from the identically noised probe signals. For UWB (UltraWideBand) or OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing) communications many key bits can be generated using a single exchange of a probe signal [7] , [8] .
The most researched case is that only one key bit can be generated per probe signal exchange, for example using RSSI values or the phase of the signal. In this case Alice and Bob have to exchange the identical probe signal at least n times to generate an n-bit long key. Fig. 1 illustrates such a key generation.
In case of key generation using channel parameters the environment has to be:
-static while the probe signal is exchanged. Otherwise Alice and Bob can have different RSSI values for the generation of the key bit; -dynamic after each exchange of the probe signal: the geometry of the room or the coordinates of Alice and Bob have to be changed significantly. Otherwise Alice and Bob can have the same RSSI values as for the previous pair of probe signals for the generation of the next key bit, so that the sequence of the generated key bits will not be random. In reality the exchanged probe signals are similar but not identical and the environment can be non-static while the probe signal is exchanged. These differences can cause differences in the keys generated on Alice's and Bob's sides, which can be compensated by collecting more than n RSSI values and using adequate quantization algorithms. In such a case an additional step -the verification of the equivalency of Alice's and Bob's generated keys key A and key B respectively -is necessary. This can be done for example by sending and comparing the hash values of both keys (see Fig. 1 ). Only if both hash values are equal hash(key A ) = hash(key B ) it will be assumed that the generated keys are the same, i.e. secret AB = key A = key B . The hash can be sent only once, i.e. from Alice to Bob. If the generated keys are not identical, the key generation approach has to be repeated from the beginning, i.e. starting with the collection of new RSSI values. Another disadvantage of this method is the fact that the generated keys can be predictable or even manipulated using the environment. For example, changes in the room geometry (or coordinates of Alice and Bob) can be predictable; the quality of the communication can be manipulated e.g. by adding walls or by jamming.
Thus, the time of the key generation using channel parameters is long and not deterministic. The quality of the generated keys depends on a lot of factors and the problem of the (mutual) authentication of participants is not solved. In spite of these disadvantages the generation of a symmetric cryptographic key using channel parameters is investigated in literature in [9] - [12] as a promising alternative to the classical key exchange approaches (see Table 1 ), because the complex computations in Galois fields can be avoided. Important is that not only the computations but also sending and receiving of the data require energy and time. The energy that is necessary for data transmission can be even higher than the energy for computations. Due to this fact, not only the computational burden but also the amount of transmitted data has to be estimated and taken into account for a fair comparison of different key exchange approaches. Table 2 gives an estimation of transmitted information and computational burden for selected classical key exchange approaches and for the key generation using channel parameters of a wireless communication. The key exchange approach using ECC is the best of the classical methods regarding the computational burden, i.e. it is better than ECDH and MTI based approaches. Only a 128 bit long random number has to be generated that is about 100 bit less than for other methods, and only 3 kP operations have to be executed in total i.e. one kP less than for ECDH and 3 kP less than for MTI. Using our hardware accelerator for NIST EC B-233 [13] one kP operation needs about 13 000 clock cycles to be executed and consumes about 2 µJ energy. Using the classical approaches given in Table 2 in total 468 bits of information have to be transmitted to exchange a 128 bit long symmetric session key, i.e. 2 packets with up to 234 bits are necessary for a compressed representation of two 233 bit long EC point coordinates. The transmission of 468 bits of data consumes about 360 µJ for sending and 180 µJ for receiving using IHP FeuerWhere sensor nodes [14] , [15] . Thus the energy of the data transmission 360 µJ + 180 µJ = 540 µJ is 270 µJ higher than the energy for a kP operation.
The assessment of the computational burden and of the data transmission energy for the approaches using the channel parameters is not deterministic. Depending on the applied quantization algorithm a different number of probe signals has to be exchanged. Some algorithms need exactly 128 probe signal exchanges for the generation of the 128 bit long symmetric secret key but others need α times more exchanges (see coefficient α in Table 2 ). Alice and Bob obtain a channel parameter, for example an RSSI value, for each probe signal. With the goal to reduce the data transmission energy packets without a payload, i.e. empty packets can be exchanged and used for calculating the RSSI value. This means that only for the collection of the data, that are inputs for the quantization algorithm, Alice and Bob have to exchange 128 · α probe signals which consumes about 22.4 · α mJ energy on each side. Energy and time of the calculation of 128 · α RSSI values from probe signals, processing of these values using the quantization algorithm and the calculation of the hash of the generated key on each communication side can be used for the estimation of the minimal computational burden. Even if the calculation burden is negligible in comparison to a kP operation, the calculated hash values have to be exchanged, i.e. 2 packets with 256 bits of the data have to be sent, consuming about 579 µJ using IHP FeuerWhere sensor nodes. If the exchanged hash values are different, the key generation approach has to be repeated from its beginning. The variable x in Table 2 represents the number of key generation loops performed until an identical secret key will be generated by both communication partners.
III. COLLECTION OF THE KEY MATERIAL IN AN INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT A. MEASUREMENT SETUP
We performed all our measurements in a real industrial environment, which is a model factory with two movable robot arms and a milling machine. The measurement setup is shown in Fig. 2 .
We used for our measurements four identical sensor nodes: Master M, Slave S, Eve1 (shortly denoted as E1) and Eve2 (E2). The Master sends a probe signal to the Slave: M → S. The two malicious nodes, Eve1 and Eve2, can also listen to this communication. The distance between the Slave and Eve1 is small, only 10 cm (see Fig. 2 ) which is about one third of the wave length λ of the communication frequency 868 MHz (λ ≈ 35 cm).
The distance between Slave, Master and Eve2 is in all our measurement by far larger than the wave length λ. The positions of Slave, Eve1 and Eve2 are the same for all measurements. Only the position of the Master was changed from position 1 to position 2 (see Fig. 2 ).
The experiments were made with the goal to investigate how the geometry of the room and the activity of industrial instruments such as the robots or the milling machine influence the parameters of the wireless communication channel and in consequence the generated keys. Table 3 gives an overview of the different measurement cases.
In Fig. 3 the observed communications are shown schematically.
For our measurements we used the IHP FeuerWhere [15] low-power sensor nodes (see Fig. 4 ) with following features:
-three low-power transceivers: Sub 1 GHz RF transceiver (TI CC1101), 2.4 GHz RF transceiver (TI CC2500), 2. The RSSI value will be obtained using the preamble. The data field in our experiments consists of n = 4 byte. from the radio module. Afterwards the Slave responses with a new probe signal to the Master. Now the Master obtains its RSSI value of the received signal. The malicious nodes Eve1 and Eve2 listen to the communication between Master and Slave and obtain their own RSSI values for all received probe signals. The structure of the packet that we used as a probe signal is shown in (see Fig. 5 ).
The packet consists of a preamble, a synchronization word, a length, an address, a data and a CRC-field. The RSSI value of the packet is determined using the preamble. This means that the data field in such packets can be empty if the packet is used as a probe signal. In our experiments the data field is always 4 bytes long:
• the 1 st byte is the identifier of the sender;
• the 2 nd and 3 rd bytes contain the sequence number of the exchanged probe signal. This is necessary for our experiments to determine pairs of request and answer signals. Only these pairs have to be processed further. Each request without an answer has to be excluded from further processing;
• the 4 th byte of the data field is only used for measurement purposes in our experiments. As the Master and the Slave do not have sufficient memory to store all RSSI values for later processing these values need to be send to a storage device. In simple words the 4 th byte is used to piggyback the RSSI value determined from the last probe of the Master and the Slave, respectively. These values are read and stored to a laptop device by E1 and E2 that are attached to the laptop device for later analysis.
Thus, with the goal to keep the communication time between Master and Slave as small as possible we used nodes Eve1 and Eve2 not only for listing to the communication but also for processing all received packets. The information allocated in the 4 th byte of packets allows using the nodes Master and Slave only for the exchange of the probe signals and obtaining RSSI values: after sending the request signal the Master changes its mode immediately from ''send'' to ''receive'' and vice versa. The change of the modes on both nodes occurs quasi parallel in time and takes in our experiments about 40 ms. The duration of the probe signal is 1.694 ms. Thus, the minimal time needed for the communication on the Master node is 1.7 + 40.0 + 1.7 = 43.4 ms.
We executed 12000 request-answer cycles in our experiments lasting about 20 minutes but we could collect only about 5000 pairs because a lot of packets are lost. For further processing we selected 4864 request-answer pairs. This was sufficient for generating 38 keys with a length of 128 bits. We didn't collect more measurements because a key exchange approach that requires a lot of energy and time is not reasonable for application in industrial environments. Fig. 6 -Fig. 8 show the RSSI values for each node in each of the measurment cases defined in Table 3 . The RSSI values collected on the Slave node are shown as green line in Fig. 6 -Fig. 8 reflecting that the the communication from the Master to the Slave (M → S) is shown in green color in Fig. 3 . The blue line in Fig. 6 -Fig. 8 
B. MEASUREMENT RESULTS

IV. QUANTIZATION OF MEASURED DATA: GENERATION OF THE KEYS
To generate a common secret key out of the RSSI values different quantization algorithms can be used. The main objectives of such algorithms are shown below.
1) Decreasing the influence of non-reciprocity of the channel. An ideal case is: -each new key, generated on the Master node is identical to the key, simultaneously generated on the Slave node; -a malicious node that can listen to the communication obtains a key that differs significantly from the key of the Master and the Slave. 2) Increasing the quality of the generated keys.
In an ideal case the agreed keys are a random sequence of bits. 3) Increasing the key generation rate.
In an ideal case the time for the key agreement using channel parameters is significantly shorter than the one using any other key exchange approach, for example compared to the approaches based on ECC. In our experiments we generated keys using 5 different quantization algorithms. They are shortly described in the following subsection using a part of our collected RSSI values i.e. the pairs from number 901 up to 940 as an example. The estimation of the quality of the generated keys and the channel reciprocity will be given in the next sections.
A. QUANTIZATION ALGORITHMS
Algorithm 1:
This algorithm uses the mean value of 128 collected RSSI values as threshold in order to transform the RSSI values into a sequence of 128 key bits. This algorithm is one of most referenced ones in the literature which is the reason why we implemented it.
1) The Master and the Slave calculate the mean of 128 collected RSSI values. The mean values on both nodes can be (and usually are) different.
The Master and the Slave generate their keys using the same formula (algorithm):
In formula (1) k i is the value of the key bit at the position i (0 ≤ i ≤ 127). Fig. 9 illustrates the generation of the key on the Master and the Slave nodes using Algorithm 1.
Corresponding to formula (1) each RSSI value greater than the mean value results in a key bit '1' and each RSSI value smaller or equal to the mean value causes the key bit to be '0'. The mean value for the Master mean Master = −48.94 dBm was obtained using RSSI values collected on the Master node for the generation of the 8 th key i.e. using the RSSI numbers 897 up to 1024. In the same way the mean value mean Slave = −58.95 dBm for the Slave was calculated. The obtained key The generated bit sequences are not identical: 2 of 40 bits, in our example are different, displayed in red. This fact shows that the reciprocity of the channel is not ideal. Moreover, the generated bit sequences consist of long subsequences of '1' and '0'. Algorithm 2: This algorithm is based on a comparison of the current and the previous RSSI values as follows:
For generating a 128 bits long key 129 RSSI values are necessary. Fig. 10 illustrates the generation of the key on the Master and the Slave nodes using formula (2) .
The fact that the current RSSI value RSSI i is equal to the previous RSSI value i.e. to RSSI i−1 is shown in Fig. 10 as '→'. The symbol '↑' represents that RSSI i > RSSI i−1 and the symbol '↓' illustrates that RSSI i < RSSI i−1 .
The obtained key bit sequences using the RSSI values and this algorithm as shown in Fig. 10 are:
Master: 1010111001010100111011111101111111111111 Slave: 1001010110110111011011010111111111111111 Also here, the generated bit sequences are not identical: 13 of 40 bits are different (see positions marked in red). In comparison to Algorithm 1 the generated bit sequences look more random but their identical parts also consist of a long sequence of '1'. Algorithm 2 is a version of the Adaptive Secret Bit Generation (ASBG) presented in [16] .
In [16] the authors claim that this algorithm provides the highest entropy of all algorithms researched by them. We could not verify this claim as important information such as the number of RSSI values, measured in total, are missing in [16] . In addition in [16] there are discrepancies between what the authors report in their tables and in their graphs. [12] reports on an evaluation of the algorithm proposed in [16] using their own implementation und measurement results. The results in [16] also show an insufficient randomness of the generated keys.
Algorithm 3: This algorithm was proposed in [10] and needs 128 RSSI values for generating 128 bits long key.
The Master calculates the maximal and minimal values in the set of collected RSSI values, denoted as RSSI max und RSSI min . The interval = |RSSI max − RSSI min | will be divided into n equal intervals, called quantization levels [10] . In our implementation RSSI max = −42 dBm, RSSI min = −53.5 dBm and n = 8, i.e. we have 8 quantization levels that correspond to the 1-bit Adaptive Quantization Scheme [10] . Each level is |53.5−42|/8 = 1.4375 dBm. Each quantization level, numbered from 1 up to 8, can be numbered using a Gray code (see Table 4 ):
Each of the collected RSSI values is assigned to a quantization level, i.e. mapped into one of the intervals listed in the last column of Table 4 . Thus, each RSSI value can be represented using its Gray code index number. For example, the Master's RSSI 901 = −46.5 dBm is in quantization level 5 (see Fig. 11 ) and will be represented by d1d0e = 110. Also the RSSI values 902-907 are in quantization level 5 and will be represented by the same 3-bit long number d1d0e = 110. The Gray code representation of other RSSI values of the Master is shown at the top of Fig. 11 .
The Slave processes its RSSI values in the same way: it calculates its own interval = |RSSI max − RSSI min | = |63.5 − 52.5| = 1.375 dBm; divides the interval into 8 quantization levels and represents each RSSI value as a 3-bit Gray code. This representation is shown at the bottom of Fig. 11 . For example the Slave's RSSI values 917-930 are in quantization level 3 and are represented as d1d0e = 011. After representing RSSI values as Gray code the Master sends all ''e''-bit values to the Slave, i.e. the Master sends its 128 bit long ''e-line''. The Slave replaces its own ''e-line'' with the one received from the Master and uses this modified Gray code representation for obtaining the key. The Master and the Slave generate the sequence of key bits using their 3-bit Gray code representation of RSSI values as follows:
For example, the Master obtains two key bit values as '1' and '1' using the RSSI values RSSI 909 and RSSI 910 respectively. Both RSSI values are located in quantization level 6 (see Fig. 11 ) and they are represented as d1d0e = 111 (see Table 4 ), i.e. e = 1 → key bit k i = d1 = 1.
On the Slave node RSSI 909 is also represented as d1d0e = 111. The Slave's own value was d1d0e = 110 because RSSI 909 is located in quantization level 5 as it is shown in Fig. 11 , but its own value e = 0 was replaced with the e-value of the Master i.e. e = 1. Thus, the Slave obtains the key bit '1' (e = 1 → k i = d1 = 1) this is the same value as on the Master node. The RSSI 910 is represented as d1d0e = 011 after replacing its own e-value with the one received from the Master. The generated key bit is '0' (e = 1 → k i = d1 = 0). The obtained key bit sequences for the RSSI values shown in Fig. 11 are:
Master: 0111111111111110000000000000001111011111 Slave: 0111111110111110000000000000001101111111
The generated bit sequences are not identical: 3 of 40 bits are different (see red marked positions). Moreover, the generated bit sequences contain long sequences of '1' and long sequences of '0'. Another disadvantage is that an additional communication from the Master to the Slave is required for the e-line exchange after the collection of the RSSI values is finished.
Algorithm 4: This algorithm was presented 2009 in [11] and is an example of quantization methods that try to find a tradeoff between the key generation rate and the probability VOLUME 5, 2017 of errors. It needs more than 128 RSSI values for generating a 128 bit long key. It uses two thresholds q + and q − in order to select RSSI values for generating the key. The thresholds are calculated with the following formula:
Here mean is the mean value of the RSSI values that are used for the key generation. In our experiments we used always 256 RSSI values, i.e. RSSI i with 0 ≤ i ≤ 255. σ is the standard deviation calculated for this set of RSSI values and α is a factor. In our experiments α = 10% that is similar to experiments in [11] with α = 1/8. Corresponding to the algorithm [11] Fig. 12 the Master sends all numbers from 904 up to 936, i.e. the set {904, 905, . . . , 936} to the Slave. The RSSI 937 value does not satisfy the above explained conditions, i.e. its index will not be sent to the Slave. In Fig. 12 the RSSI values which indices will not be sent to the Slave are shown on the blue background.
The Slave receives the set of indices (in our example, the numbers {904, 905, . . . , 936}) and examines: if m-1 (in our experiments 4-1 = 3) RSSI values are above q+ or below q− in all sequences of three RSSI values starting with: The Slave replies to the Master with a set of indices i of corresponding sequences. In our experiments the Slave sends to the Master exactly the same set {904, 905, . . . , 936}. After this step the Master and the Slave generate the key from the corresponding RSSI values using the following formula:
For the example shown in Fig. 12 the key bit sequences, obtained by using this algorithm, are 33 bit long:
Master: 000000000000000000000000000000000 Slave: 000000000000000000000000000000000
The generated bit sequences are identical but consist of '0' only. The key generation rate depends significantly on m and α: e.g. if m and α are small, for example m = 4 and α = 0.1, a 128 bit long key cannot be generated using even double the number of RSSI values, i.e. 256. Generally, the number of the RSSI values to be collected for generating a key cannot be determined a priori. Algorithm 4 comes with two drawbacks. Firstly, additional information is exchanged to agree on the set of corresponding RSSI values, which requires additional time and energy. Secondly, this exchange is done as plain text which might simplify key guessing attacks.
Algorithm 5: This algorithm was presented 2005 in [9] . To generate an n-bit long key n + N RSSI values are necessary, whereby the number N of additional RSSI values is deterministic. In our experiments we used 256 RSSI values to generate a 128 bit long key, i.e. n = N = 128. At first the Master has to remove N /2 = 64 RSSI values from the set of 256 RSSI values and after that the Slave does the same. To do so, the Master selects 128/2+64/2 largest and 128/2+64/2 smallest values, i.e. 128+64 ''good'' values together. The Master removes the ''bad'' RSSI values, i.e. the not selected 64 values and sends their positions (indices) to the Slave. Fig. 13 illustrates this algorithm.
In the example shown in Fig. 13 Master: 10000000000000000000 Slave: 10000000000000000000 These two sequences are identical but two times shorter than the sequences generated by using Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3. Please note that the generated 20 bit long part of the key consists of only one '1' and nineteen '0'. Algorithm 5 requires additional exchange of information about the ''bad'' RSSI values twice: from the Master to the Slave and from the Slave to the Master. [9] proposed to use the quantization algorithm here described as a part of a new key generation schema. The main contribution of [9] is the idea to increase the fluctuation of the channel characteristics using a beam-forming technique of special antennas. We think, this is a reasonable and promising way to generate the keys with good randomness even in a stationary environment. As we are using standard radio front ends, we cannot evaluate the influence of beamforming on the quality of the generated keys.
V. EVALUATION OF THE GENERATED KEYS
In this section we discuss two aspects of the generation of the key using channel parameters: the Bit Disagreement Rate (BDR) and the quality of the suitable keys, i.e. of those keys that are identical on both nodes. We also discuss the applicability of the RSSI values measured in an industrial environment for the key generation approaches introduced here.
We generated a relatively small number of keys using our measurement results. The main goal was to evaluate whether or not this approach can be applied in industrial environments. As these settings are requiring real time and short latencies key set-up times of several hours are by default inacceptable. Corresponding to the recent requirements of the automatization industry the time for the agreement of a 128 bit long key has to be in the range of a few milliseconds [17] . Nevertheless we run measurements for about 20 minutes for each of the six cases (case 1a, 1b and so on) to get a reasonable number of RSSI values for our evaluation.
Using Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 or Algorithm 3 and our measured RSSI values it was possible to generate 38 keys per case. Using Algorithm 5 only 19 keys could be generated. The number of the keys which could be generated using Algorithm 4 is not deterministic. In our implementation a maximum of 19 keys could be generated, but for 4 out of 6 measurement cases only a smaller number of keys was generated.
The number of identical keys generated on Master and Slave nodes in our experiments is really small and depends significantly on the dynamicity of the environment and on the quantization algorithm. For example, using Algorithm 1 only two identical keys in all six measurement cases were generated and no identical keys were generated using Algorithm 2. Algorithm 3-Algorithm 5 give better results, but all the generated identical keys look not random. They have long sequences of '1' or '0'. We assessed their randomness using 5 different tests for randomness monobit, serial, autocorrelation, runs test and compression: (run length encoder). The first four tests are described in NIST [18] . We do not run the complete NIST test [18] because the number of collected RSSI values, required to perform all tests, should exceed 10 6 .
A. QUALITY OF GENERATED KEYS
We analyzed the keys that we obtained for each quantization algorithm. Our proceeding is shown below.
1. For each of the six measurement cases and for each key l that was generated on the Master and the Slave nodes, i.e. for all keys not only for identical keys, we calculated the BDR according to the following formula:
Here length(key l ) = 128 and #identical_bits is the number of identical bits in the key key i of the Master and Slave nodes. If the Master and the Slave generated an identical key key i , its BDR is 0%. 2. For each of the six measurement cases and for each identical key key j we calculated its number of '1'-bits as a relative number:
We use the value #1 j to demonstrate that the keys generated using channel parameters are not random at least not in our experiments. One of the reasons, why this happens, is the periodical movement of robot arms and of parts of the milling machine. This fact can be a problem for an industrial environment because the manufacturing processes are periodical, i.e. the processing steps are periodically repeated. 3. For each of the six measurement cases we performed 5 randomness tests for the identical keys. The calculated BDR l and #1 j are represented graphically in Fig. 16 -Fig. 20 . Table 5 shows for each investigated quantization algorithm and each measurement case the number of generated keys, VOLUME 5, 2017 their average BDR, and the number of identical keys and the average number of '1' in identical keys. Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 illustrate Table 5 graphically. In Fig. 14 the average BDR is shown for each measurement case and each quantization algorithm. Fig. 15 shows the number of identical keys. FIGURE 16 . Quality of keys generated using Algorithm 1 for all six measurement cases. Only 2 keys in case 2c have a BDR = 0%, i.e. they are identical. The number of '1' bit values is close to 50% in both identical keys.
As it is shown in Table 6 we obtained no keys that successfully passed all 5 randomness tests. This means that the generated bit sequences can be not used as cryptographic keys.
The quality of keys generated using Algorithm 1 is represented in Fig. 16 . In each measurement case (i.e. in case 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b and 2c) we obtained 38 keys on the Master and 38 keys on the Slave nodes. The BDR for all these keys is shown in Fig. 16-a) . Only in case 2c (robots are active and the Master is behind the milling machine) two of the 38 keys were identical, i.e. their bit disagreement rate was zero (BDR = 0%). For these identical keys the number of '1' is shown in Fig. 16-b) . Fig. 17 represents the results of the analysis of the keys generated using Algorithm 2. In each of the measurement cases 38 keys were generated on the Master and 38 keys on the Slave node. Their BDR is shown in Fig. 17-a) . No identical keys are generated using Algorithm 2. Fig. 18 represents the results of the analysis of the keys generated using Algorithm 3. Also here 38 keys were generated on the Master and 38 keys on the Slave node in each of our cases. In case 1a all 38 generated keys are identical, i.e. their BDR is 0% (see Fig. 18-a) , but they consist of only '0' bit values which can be seen in Fig. 18-b . This means, the cryptographic keys generated using Algorithm 3 and RSSI values measured in a static environment are completely FIGURE 17. Quality of keys generated using Algorithm 2 for all six measurement cases. No identical keys are generated. The average BDR is about 20% in each case. FIGURE 18. Quality of keys generated using Algorithm 3 for all cases. The number of identical keys generated using Algorithm 3 is high for the static environment: 38 keys in case 1a are identical. Their BDR is 0%, but all these keys consist of '0' bit values only, and in case 2a 20 keys were identical, but the number of '0' bit values is in average 99%. For non-static cases the BDR increases, but the identical keys still contain either a big number of '0' bits or a big number of '1' bits and are not suitable as cryptographic keys.
FIGURE 19.
Quality of keys generated using Algorithm 4 for all measurement cases. The number of generated keys depends significantly on the environment and is not deterministic.
unusable. Also in cases 1b and 2a many of the generated keys are identical but consist of '0' bits only. For cases 1c, 2b and 2c about half of the generated keys are identical but they contain either a large number of '0' bits or a big number of '1' bits. Only in case 2c the identical keys consist of about 30% of '1' bit values. Fig. 19 represents the results of the analysis of the keys generated using Algorithm 4. The number of generated keys is not deterministic and depends significantly on the measurement case. In Fig. 19-a) the number of generated keys for each of the measurement case is given. In case 1a, i.e. in a static environment with the Master at position 1 (see Fig. 2 ) FIGURE 20. Quality of keys generated using Algorithm 5 for all cases. The BDR in all cases is not high excepting case 1a, for that no identical key was generated. The identical keys generated in the other cases consist to 50% of '1' bit values. (a) BDR of all generated key. (b) The number of '1' in identical keys.
no key was generated even though about 5000 RSSI values were processed. Also in case 2a, i.e. in a static environment with the Master at position 2, only 8 keys were generated and only 2 of these keys are identical. In a mobile environment the BDR of the generated keys is not high and the average number of '1' bit values in those keys is between 46% and 67% (see Table 5 ). Fig. 20 represents the results of the analysis of the keys generated using Algorithm 5. For each case 19 keys were generated. The BDR in all cases is not high excepting case 1a, for that no identical key was generated. The identical keys generated in other cases consist to 50% of '1' bit values. Table 6 shows the results of different randomness tests that we made to assess the randomness of the generated keys. Only identical keys were examined. The symbol '' √ '' means that for the given measurement case and algorithm the performed randomness test was successful. If a test was not successful it is depicted using '-'. In Table 6 cells filled in grey represent the measurement cases, for which no identical keys were generated.
B. RANDOMNESS OF MEASURED CHANNEL PARAMETERS
Due to the fact that no algorithm in all our measurement cases succeeded in all randomness tests, we decided to examine the randomness of the measured RSSI values. We performed the same randomness tests for RSSI values collected on the Master node and on the Slave node. Table 7 shows the results of the tests for our six measurement cases. Please note, only in one of these cases the RSSI values pass three out of five randomness tests (see Table 7 , measurement case 1a, RSSI values collected on the Slave).
C. QUALITY OF LISTEN BY MALICIOUS NODES
To evaluate the quality of the keys extracted by malicious nodes we analyzed the quality of the keys generated by them based on the RSSI values retrieved from the communications they eavesdropped.
-We generated keys based on the communication from the Master to the Slave eavesdropped by Eve1. -We compared the keys generated on the Eve1 and on the Slave nodes using their BDR.
where #k E1 is the number generated at Eve1. -We compared only the keys that are identical on the Master and the Slave nodes with the corresponding keys extracted on Eve1.
where #k MS_id is the number of identical keys of Master and Slave nodes. The calculated average BDR values are given in Table 8 .
In this experiment it was expected that the correlation of RSSI values measured on the Slave and Eve1 nodes is high because the node Eve1 was placed relative closely (10 cm that is ≈λ/3) to the Slave. Thus, we expected that the keys generated on the Eve1 and on the Slave node are similar and that their BDR is small. Our results show that only for Algorithm 3 and the static case the average BDR is about 4%. Important is that the keys generated using this algorithm either contain a long sequence of '0' bit values or consist of '0' bit values only, see Fig. 18-b, case 1a and  case 2a) .
The second lowest BDR of 14% was retrieved for the keys generated using Algorithm 5 and the RSSI values measured in case 2c. In this case all keys generated on the Master and the Slave are identical. They could be used as shared secret (see red filled cells in Table 8 ) except for the fact, that they are no random bit sequences. Fig. 21 gives an overview of the BDRs for all individual keys for this case (see red bars).
We made the same experiments as described above for the RSSI values measured on the Eve2 node. The calculated BDR values are shown in Table 8 . In these experiments it was expected that the correlation of RSSI values measured on the Slave and Eve2 nodes is low because the node Eve2 is placed at a distance of 80cm from the Slave that is more than 2λ. Thus, the expected BDR should be high in comparison to the BDR values of Eve1 for the same measurement set-up (compare the blue filled cells in Table 8 with the red filled cells). For Eve1 the BDR values for each key for the measurement case 2c and quantization Algorithm 5 are shown as red bars and for Eve2 these values are shown as blue bars in Fig. 21 . Table 8 shows also the results of our experiments using the RSSI values from the communication from the Slave to the Master collected on both malicious nodes. In these experiments it was expected that the keys extracted on Eve1 and Eve2 nodes differ significantly from the keys generated on the Master node, because the distance between the Master and each of the malicious nodes is about 9 m which is are significantly larger than the wave length. For Algorithm 3 in the measurement cases 1a, 1b and 2a we obtained unexpected small BDR values between 0% and 6% (see green filled cells in Table 8 ).
FIGURE 21. BDR of keys generated on Eve1 and Eve2 in comparison to the Slave node for measurement case 2c using Algorithm 5. The malicious nodes generated the keys using RSSI values of the communication eavesdropped from the Master to the Slave. The BDR values for keys generated by Eve1 (compared to the keys that are generated by Slave) are shown as blue bars. Their average value is about 53%. The BDR values for keys generated by Eve2 (compared to the keys that are generated by Slave) are shown as red bars. Their average value is 14%.
VI. A COMPARISON OF KEY AGREEMENT METHODS
In this section we compare the key generation approaches using channel parameters with a classical key agreement method based on ECC and discuss their applicability in industrial environments.
For the comparison we selected the most efficient version of the channel parameter based key generation i.e. Algorithm 5 in measurement case 2c. For the rest of this evaluation we do not consider the quality of the keys used by the different key establishment approaches. In other words we neglect the fact that the randomness keys generated from channel parameters is low and focus on the efficiency of the key setup methods only.
From the ECC based approaches we selected an MTI-based method because it leads to the highest computational burden. Our goal is to estimate the maximum time and energy needed by the ECC based approaches.
The time needed for the generation of a key using channel parameters and Algorithm 5 for the quantization of the collected RSSI values can be estimated based on our experiments as follows: we sent 12000 request-answer signals, but only 5000 request-answer pairs were collected and 19 identical 128 bit long keys were generated. As we mentioned above, we collected the RSSI values for about 20 minutes. Thus, the time for generating one key can be estimated as time > time measurements /19 ≈ 20min/19 ≈ 1 min. Because this key generation time estimated using real measurements is to long to be applicable for automation industry, we use instead a best case assumption for the evaluations. Some steps of the key generation approach using channel parameters and the ECCbased approach need calculation time and energy for sending and receiving packets, determined as follows: time = t overhead + n · 26µs energy = P · time.
(10) Here t overhead = 1694µs; n is the number of bits in the data field of a packet. The sending power is P = 46.2mW and the receiving power is P = 23.1mW corresponding to [14] .
The calculation of the time and energy consumption of both approaches is shown step by step in Table 9 . Also the result of our estimations is summarized in Table 9 : the ECC based approach needs 0.04 s only to exchange keys whereas the approach using channel parameters needs 2.7 s which is about 70 times slower.
The analysis presented in this section shows that even in the optimal case the key generation cannot meet the timing requirements for key exchange or key set-up as required at least for a part of the automation cases. Even worse, the key generation based on channel parameters may take unpredictable long times even up to several days [19] . This fact is inacceptable in automation systems that require real time.
Our comparison of the key distribution approaches clearly indicates that standard key agreement protocols such as the ECC based ones outperform the key generation from channel parameters. This holds not only true for the effort i.e. time and energy needed to agree on a shared key but also for the quality of the keys. The keys we generated were not random which might allow a potential attacker to guess the keys and even can relatively easy manipulate the keys e.g. by changing the environment.
The ECC based approaches provide in addition to the key exchange a means to properly authenticate the sender VOLUME 5, 2017 of a certain message which is infeasible if the keys are generated from channel parameters without any additional means.
VII. CONCLUSION
The generation of a common secret key out of channel parameters like RSSI is a relatively new field of research and gets quite a lot of attention as it promises to avoid heavy processing as it is required when asymmetric cryptographic approaches are applied for key exchange. This is very appealing whenever resource constraint devices are used. In this paper we investigated the applicability of this new approach for the field of automation systems using channel parameters i.e. RSSI values recorded in a real industrial environment.
One of the lessons we learned is that the duration of the key generation based on channel parameters is not deterministic and may take a long time. This also means that it requires a significant amount of energy as messages need to be exchanged to have channel parameters. So, this approach is not suitable for resource constraint devices. It is also not applicable in real time systems in which the duration of a certain operation needs to be deterministic and even very fast sometimes. Based on this experience we started a comparison of the key generation approaches with classical key establishment approaches. The result is that the latter outperform the key generation approaches even if we consider the worst case for classical approaches and the best case for the key generation approaches using channel parameters.
The second lesson we learned is that none of algorithms tested here was able to generate truly random common keys, which makes the keys more vulnerable against attacks like brute-forcing. In contrast to that classical key exchange approaches allow the use of well tested random number generators which in turn lead to high quality keys.
We admit that we applied execution times of special hardware providing cryptographic operations when we compared the energy consumption of the different approaches, but as this hardware is as small as 0.3 mm 2 and by that will cost most probably less than 20 cent we are sure that for automation systems such a solution is feasible.
We also like to point out that our findings are based on measurements done at a frequency of 868 MHz and with standard RSSI values. This means that at a different frequency and or when using other or more channel parameters the key generation approaches may provide better results. We will run the experiments described here again using a radio operating at 5.4 GHz and proving us with 5-8 values from its preamble. 1 The time and energy consumed while generating random numbers on a MSP430F5438A [20] at 8 MHz. The operations needed to generate these numbers are described in [21] . The energy consumption of the operations was calculated according to the procedure described in [22] . The exact values used for this calculation were taken from [20] .
